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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-1720 
_____________ 
 
JOSEPH V. PATERNO, a/k/a Jay; WILLIAM KENNEY 
 
v. 
 
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
Joseph “Jay” V. Paterno, William Kenney,  
 
                                                      Appellants  
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-14-cv-04365) 
District Judge: Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2016 
______________ 
 
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 9, 2017) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION*  
______________ 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 Plaintiffs-Appellants Joseph “Jay” Paterno and William Kenney (collectively 
“Appellants”) appeal the District Court’s grant of Defendant-Appellee the Pennsylvania 
State University’s (“Penn State”) Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.  The District Court 
properly granted the motion.  We will affirm. 
I. Background 
 This suit arises out of Appellants’ allegations of being deprived of liberty and 
property interests in their reputations and employment.  They also allege a civil 
conspiracy to deprive them of those interests.  Appellants were assistant football coaches 
with the Penn State football program under Head Coach Joseph “Joe” Paterno (“Head 
Coach Paterno”).  On November 9, 2011, the Penn State Board of Trustees voted to 
relieve Head Coach Paterno of his duties due to his failure to address former Penn State 
assistant football coach Gerald Sandusky’s sexual abuse of children (the “Sandusky 
Scandal”).1  A few months later, on January 6, 2012, Penn State announced that it had 
hired William O’Brien to replace Head Coach Paterno.  Coach O’Brien released 
Appellants from their positions, and they were subsequently fired by Penn State in mid-
January 2012.  
  On November 11, 2011, Penn State formed a Special Investigations Task Force, 
which engaged Freeh Sporkin & Sullivan, LLP (the “Freeh Firm”) (1) to investigate the 
alleged failure of Penn State to respond to and report the Sandusky Scandal and (2) to 
                                                 
1 Sandusky was charged and convicted of “various criminal offenses, including 
aggravated criminal assault, corruption of minors, unlawful contact with minors and 
endangering the welfare of minors.”  First Am. Compl. ¶ 1.   
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recommend policies that would allow Penn State to more effectively prevent and respond 
to incidents of sexual abuse of minors.  The Freeh Firm published its report (the “Freeh 
Report”) on July 12, 2012.  On July 22, 2012, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (the “NCAA”) prepared a Consent Decree—using the Freeh Report as its 
underlying basis—that sanctioned Penn State for its role in the Sandusky Scandal.  As 
part of the sanctions, Penn State waived any claim to further NCAA-established 
processes to determine and appeal violations (the “NCAA Rights”).   
 Appellants filed suit against Penn State on July 21, 2014, alleging federal and state 
law violations in the termination of their employment.  Appellants also filed an amended 
complaint on November 24, 2014.  Appellants alleged that Penn State deprived them of 
their liberty and property interests without due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Appellants alleged that the Consent Decree deprived them of their procedural rights as 
established in Penn State’s bylaws, charter, and standing orders that govern Penn State’s 
relationship with the NCAA and with them (the “Penn State Rights”).  They also alleged 
the following state law claims: intentional interference with prospective contractual 
relations; civil conspiracy; violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection 
Law; and breach of contract.  Appellee filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.   
 The District Court dismissed Appellants’ claims of deprivation of property and 
liberty interests without due process and civil conspiracy.  The District Court found that 
Appellants had no property interest in their continued employment and thus could not be 
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deprived of it.  The Court also found that Appellants did not properly allege a deprivation 
of liberty interest in their reputations.  Finally, the District Court dismissed the 
conspiracy claim because it had dismissed the § 1983 claims as the object of the 
conspiracy.   
 After dismissing the federal claims, the District Court declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.  This appeal followed. 
II. Standard of Review2 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss.  
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[W]e are ‘required to accept as true all allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing 
them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.’”  Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 
333, 341 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 
154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014)).  We “must consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the 
complainant’s claims are based upon these documents.”  Id. (quoting Mayer v. Belichick, 
605 F.3d 223, 230 (3d Cir. 2010)).   
                                                 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 but declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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III. Analysis 
 On appeal, Appellants raise two issues.  First, they contend that their complaint 
alleged enough facts to state a plausible § 1983 claim that Penn State deprived them of 
their liberty interest in their reputations in conjunction with (1) the loss of their property 
interests in their NCAA and Penn State Rights3 and (2) their termination.  Second, they 
assert that their complaint alleged sufficient facts to state a civil conspiracy claim 
predicated on the § 1983 claim. 
A. Loss of Liberty Interest in Reputation Claims 
 In order to support a due process claim for deprivation of a liberty interest in 
reputation, the plaintiff must show (1) a stigma to his or her reputation plus (2) a 
deprivation of an additional right or interest.  Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 
236 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).  This conjunctive 
analysis is known as the “stigma-plus” test.  Id.  In the public-employment context, an 
employer must have “create[d] and disseminate[d] a false and defamatory impression 
about the employee in connection with his termination” in order for a plaintiff to satisfy 
the test.  Id. (quoting Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 628 (1977)).   
 Appellants alleged that the execution of the Consent Decree, press conference 
statements from the NCAA, press releases from Penn State, their termination, and the 
                                                 
3 The NCAA Rights afford “involved individuals” notice and opportunity to 
respond to allegations of violations of the NCAA’s rules.  First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 112, 114–
15.  An “involved individual” is a person “who is alleged to have significant involvement 
in an alleged rules’ violation.”  First Am. Compl. ¶ 116.  The Penn State Rights provide a 
name-clearing hearing.   
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loss of their NCAA and Penn State Rights deprived them of their liberty interests in their 
reputations.  Specifically, Appellants alleged that Penn State made or adopted the 
following statements (collectively, “the Statements”) that harmed their reputations: 
 Consent Decree statement (the “Actionable Statement”); 
 January 6, 2012 press release (the “O’Brien Press Release”); 
 January 23, 2012 press release; 
 February 18, 2012 press release; 
 Press conference statements announcing the Consent Decree (the “Press 
Conference Statements”); 
 
 Post-press conference press release (the “PSU Release”).  
 
We review the Statements to determine whether they plausibly created a defamatory 
impression about Appellants. 
1. Actionable Statement 
 The Consent Decree included the following Actionable Statement from the Freeh 
Report: “[S]ome coaches, administrators and football program staff members ignored the 
red flags of Sandusky’s behaviors and no one warned the public about him.”  First Am. 
Compl. ¶ 169.   
 Appellants complained that “[t]he effect of the Actionable Statement was that . . . 
following the lengthy investigation by the Freeh Firm, both Penn State and the NCAA . . . 
had come to the conclusion that Plaintiffs, as coaches with the Penn State football 
program, were involved in child sexual abuse conduct and therefore it is this Actionable 
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Statement that has caused Plaintiffs their injury.”  First Am. Compl. ¶ 176.  While 
Appellants conceded that the Actionable Statement did not name either of them, they 
alleged that “some coaches” is “a limited group of individuals that includes Plaintiffs, is 
discrete in size and consists of people who are well-known in the community or whose 
identity could easily be discovered upon inquiry.”  First Am. Compl. ¶ 178.  In their 
brief, Appellants support this assertion by arguing that it is reasonable for many people 
who heard or read the phrase “some coaches” to believe that it included Appellants, and 
that Appellants were “complicit and/or turned a blind eye to the child sex abuse.”  
Appellants’ Br. at 32.   
 Although the group of coaches to whom the Actionable Statement applies is small, 
“a group’s size is not the sole consideration in determining whether individual members 
may assert defamation claims based upon statements about the group.”  Alvord-Polk, Inc. 
v. F. Schumacher & Co., 37 F.3d 996, 1015–16 (3d Cir. 1994).  Rather, “statements 
which disparage [the group] may not serve as a basis for an individual defamation claim 
unless a reader could reasonably connect them to the complaining individual.” Id. at 
1016. 
 Here, there is no reasonable connection between “some coaches” and Appellants.  
The Consent Decree provides that “[t]he entirety of the factual findings in the Freeh 
Report” supported the NCAA conclusions.  App. 102.  After noting that “[a] detailed 
recitation of the Freeh Report is not necessary,” the Consent Decree quotes three 
paragraphs from the report’s Executive Summary.  App. 102.  The Actionable Statement 
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appears within this quotation.  As such, the Actionable Statement is a summary of the 
findings in the body of the Freeh Report and applies to the coaches named in the report.  
The only coaches, apart from Sandusky, referenced by name in the report are Head Coach 
Paterno and assistant football coach Michael McQueary.4  Furthermore, Head Coach 
Paterno and McQueary are the only coaches implicated in the Freeh Report for failing to 
intervene appropriately in the Sandusky Scandal. 5  And only Head Coach Paterno is 
named in the Consent Decree.  Thus, viewing Appellants’ complaint in the most 
favorable light to Appellants does not allow for a reasonable nexus between the use of 
“some coaches” and Appellants.   
 Even if there were a nexus, Appellants still have failed to allege that the 
Actionable Statement was made “in connection with” their terminations.  Hill, 455 F.3d 
at 236 (quoting Codd, 429 U.S. at 628).  To be considered “in connection with” a 
termination, the defamatory statement must be “so closely related to discharge from 
employment that the discharge itself may become stigmatizing in the public eye.”  Ulrich 
v. City & County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 983 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Temporal proximity is a crucial consideration in this analysis.  See 
Martz v. Inc. Vill. of Valley Stream, 22 F.3d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1994) (declining to find 
                                                 
4 The link to the Freeh Report provided in Exhibit F is nonfunctional.  We rely on 
the following archived link to the report: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20120713173804/http://www.thefreehreportonpsu.com/REP
ORT_FINAL_071212.pdf.  
5 The report also accused Penn State President Graham B. Spanier, Senior Vice 
President-Finance and Business Gary C. Schultz, and Athletic Director Timothy M. 
Curley of involvement in the scandal. 
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temporal nexus where statements were published five months after termination); Siegert 
v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991) (noting that alleged defamatory letter written “several 
weeks” after resignation “was not uttered incident to the termination”);  
 Here, the NCAA issued the Consent Decree nearly six months after Appellants 
were fired.  Nothing in the intervening time period suggests a connection between these 
two events.  Appellants were terminated as part of a shake-up in coaching staff that 
routinely followed the hiring of a new head coach.  The “nation-wide media frenzy” 
surrounding the revelations about Sandusky’s abuse, which Appellants say kept alive 
rumors of their complicity, failed to make their claim of a connection any more plausible.  
Appellants’ Br. at 41. 
 As such, the Actionable Statement does not constitute the creation or 
dissemination of a false and defamatory impression for purposes of the stigma-plus test. 
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2. Other Statements 
 In their complaint, Appellants highlighted the following key phrases from the 
press releases and the Press Conference Statement as stigmatizing. 
 O’Brien Press Release: “A program of this caliber requires a special kind of 
leader—a leader who will embrace that legacy and maintain the University’s 
commitment to excellence on the field and in the classroom. . . . We have found 
the man to take Penn State football forward . . . . Needless to say, we have been 
looking for someone with some very special qualities, beginning with a heart that 
beats to the values and vision of Penn State University and our Penn State football 
legacy and tradition.  That was our starting point, and Coach O’Brien exemplifies 
those traits that Penn Staters hold so highly.  In addition to his model 
characteristics as a man and a teacher . . . . He will embrace tradition, demand 
excellence and pursue Success with Honor in every phase of our program. . . . 
[S]tated O’Brien. . . . ‘As head coach of this special football program, it is my 
responsibility to ensure that this program represents the highest level of character, 
respect and integrity in everything we do.  That includes my coaching staff . . . .’”  
First Am. Compl. ¶ 70. 
 January 23, 2012 Press Release: “Regrettably, Coach Paterno did not finish his 
coaching career in the manner he or anyone else expected . . . .”  First Am. 
Compl. ¶ 73. 
 February 18, 2012 Press Release (Referring to Coach O’Brien’s new coaching 
staff): “This is a staff made up of men who care about the mission of Penn State 
University and being successful on and off the field.  It is also a staff of winners.”  
First Am. Compl. ¶ 76. 
 Press Conference Statements:  “[W]e are reserving the right, after the conclusion 
of all of the criminal charges and proceedings that will go forward to look into 
any potential investigations or penalties that may need to be imposed on 
individuals, but for the time being, we’re not doing anything with individuals. . . . 
[T]he NCAA is reserving the right to initiate a formal investigation and 
disciplinary processes, to impose sanctions as needed on individuals involved in 
this case . . . . [W]e expressly have, in these sanctions and findings, withheld 
judgment on individuals, and will continue to do so until all of the criminal 
investigations have concluded, and until then we won’t have any comment on 
individuals.”  First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 183–84, 210. 
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 PSU Press Release (Penn State announcing the acceptance of the NCAA’s 
sanctions):  “It is with this compass that we will strive for a better tomorrow.  
Penn State will move forward with a renewed sense of commitment to excellence 
and integrity in all aspects of our University.”  First Am. Compl. ¶ 213. 
None of the above statements specifically refer to Appellants—either explicitly or 
implicitly.  The only member of the coaching staff during the Sandusky Scandal who is 
specifically mentioned is Head Coach Paterno.  Rather, most of the statements speak to 
the culture of Penn State and its football program.  The Press Conference Statements 
discuss when the NCAA would proceed with its own investigation against “individuals.”  
It would not be reasonable to conclude that these were false and defamatory statements 
about Appellants because “individuals” could apply to anyone in the football program or 
school administrators.  As such, these statements do not satisfy the stigma prong of the 
stigma-plus test.   
 Because we find that none of the complained of statements are stigmatizing, 
Appellants did not meet the stigma-plus test and thus did not adequately allege a claim of 
deprivation of liberty interest in their reputations.  The failure to allege a stigma makes it 
unnecessary for us to determine whether Appellants adequately alleged as a “plus” the 
deprivation of property interests in their NCAA and Penn State Rights or employment.  
Therefore, the District Court properly dismissed the § 1983 claim. 
 B. Conspiracy Claim 
“A claim brought under § 1983 can only be sustained if the defendant has deprived 
the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right while acting under color of state 
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law.”  Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 672 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because we find that 
Appellants’ deprivation claim was properly dismissed, we must also find the alleged 
conspiracy was properly dismissed since an essential element of the conspiracy—
deprivation of a federally protected right—does not exist.   
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court. 
